Is there such a thing as totalitarian ideology? By way of an anecdotal introduction, consider the problem like so. In the multi-authored Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, the chapter on totalitarianism is placed within the section of the book that covers the history of the discipline, not within the section that includes entries on distinctive, self-standing ideologies in their own right. In other words, 'communism' and 'fascism' are just like liberalism, conservatism and socialism; 'totalitarianism' is not.
1 Why should that be? And does it indicate a wider convention that needs challenging?
The argument of this article is that the reluctance to theorise totalitarian ideology is a hangover from the end-of-ideology thesis. That thesis did give totalitarianism an ideological identity, but did so only at the cost of presenting ideology itself as the great bogeyman. Yet a half century and more after the thesis' heyday this inauspicious precedent does not, and
should not, prevent an ideology of totalitarianism from being constructed along more promising lines; in particular, by using a more adequate conception of ideology. However, at the same time, the sceptics of the end-of-ideology thesis -as well as, presumably, the editors of the Oxford Handbook -are onto something real, which should not be played down. From the perspective of ideology studies, there is a special obstacle that arises in theorising totalitarianism, as compared with the objects that are the mainstay of our investigations.
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That is the problem of incoherence. 2 In previous work I have made cases for understanding totalitarianism as ideology to audiences of both political theorists and intellectual historians. The case made here is intended to persuade the ideology scholar. For the argument directed at political theorists, see R. Shorten, 'Rethinking Totalitarian Ideology: Insights from the Anti-Totalitarian Canon', political languages -will be in tension with the study of ideology. 6 Moreover, their combination in creative and exploratory ways might be especially apposite for the empirical study of past ideological configurations. 7 Hence, taking our bearings from the history of political thought, the more accurate designation of the illustrative idea is not quite the recalcitrant text, rather the 'pamphlet'. In respect of our prospective sources of totalitarian thought, this designation is apt as an indicator not so much of predicable length, rather than of the relative coherence of the argument we should be braced to find. In other words, as opposed to Hobbes' Leviathan -with its explicit debt to geometrical reasoning, the template is Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France -with its elaborate digressions, overlapping themes, and distinct emotional register.
It is important to emphasise that there is an independent reason for interpreting totalitarian ideology through some select texts (qua pamphlets) that may be only few in number. In the main the possibilities for creatively combining a less lofty history of political thought with the study of ideology will tend to point to the analysis of a source-base which is broad, not narrow. Yet we should expect one of the peculiarities of the totalitarian political context to be to raise select texts to a privileged position. Namely, there will be predictable towards the Fuhrer'. In the totalitarian context, elites set the tone for patterns of political thinking, much as they do for the formulation of policy. 8 Note, however, that making totalitarian ideology largely a matter of elite discourse is not the same as theorising the sort of ideational package which is monolithic. The end-of-ideology perspectives tend to identify the sources correctly -and by contrast with many of the critics of theories of totalitarianism.
Yet what they miss is the recalcitrance. The structure of the discussion which follows is threefold. Before getting to the actual proposal for how analysts of ideology might add totalitarianism to their collection of cases, the article proceeds through two stages. Taken together, these two stages are intended to persuade an audience of ideology scholars to apply 'business-as-usual' -as with the study of other ideological configurations, to endorse a shift from macro-to micro-analysis. In theorising totalitarianism, this is presented as amounting to a shift from structure to content.
Therefore, a first section contrasts two theories of totalitarianism -one structural, the other ideological -each of which emerged by the middle of the twentieth century. Honing in on the latter theory, a second section contrasts two ways of thinking about totalitarian ideology:
the legacy of the end-of-ideology thesis is to think about that as structural still, and thus to fail to apply the more promising analysis of content. Quentin Skinner on behalf of the study of the history of political thought. One aim here is adapt the approach so that it can be integrated into our range of methodologies for analysing political ideology. But another aim is more ambitious: to call for an expansion of that methodological range, so that an extended collection of ideologies can each be given their own identities, and by a process of trial-and-error. Thus, just prior presenting the textual evidence in favour of understanding totalitarianism on the Collingwoodian approach, the article makes some suggestions regarding the bigger picture. It recommends for ideology scholars a spirit of inventiveness, so that we may begin to map an ideological field which is not only fuller, but also more complex, more variegated and, in particular, inclusive of many sorts of configuration which seem to lack coherence on first sight. An appendix to the proposal is a tentative effort to accommodate Islamism.
Two theories of totalitarianism: from structure to ideology
A shift in the interpretation of totalitarianism is called for so that an ideological model comes to supplant a structural one. In the commentary on totalitarianism, such a shift has already been in train roughly since the 1990s. 10 The shift is anticipated, however, in the earliest thinking on the subject. A revealing fact is that even by the 1950s there was a split in theories of totalitarianism that ought to have been evident to the observer. A first model was dominant ('structural' totalitarianism); but there was also a second, an early articulation of 'ideological' totalitarianism. The best way of viewing what is peculiar, and also inadequate, about the early ideological account is by contrast with the structural model. Primary is the rigidity of the system, or its 'absolutizing' quality. Fanatical behaviourexpressed both in extreme passions and the intrusion of public into private life -is premised upon that rigidity (i.e. the 'mystifying' and 'all-encompassing' qualities). As for the 'utopian' quality, the suspicion might well be this is left out of Aron's statement insofar as it is simply implied. In one aspect, the understanding of ideology as utopian amounts to a partisan reaction to an immediate target: the contemporaneous spectre of communism in the earliest (and 'hottest') phase of the Cold War.
To state all this is to do no more than point to an obvious, if pleasing, paradox. When the end-of-ideology thesis is simultaneously considered as a contribution to totalitarianism theory and to ideology studies, this is to make totalitarianism ideological, and ideology totalitarian. However, the suggestion is that this paradox is consequential. Theories of totalitarianism have still not yet made best use of some quite conventional tools for ideology analysis -let alone more inventive ones, and especially in respect of content. How to show this? Labouring with inadequate tools is particularly evident in the recent popularity of theories of political religion. 21 These theories are heirs to the end-of-ideology thesis because they continue to make the key argument into one concerning ideological structure -from which quasi-religious behaviours are understood to derive (for example, rituals, cults and spectacles). 22 Echoing Aron, the contemporary theorists of political religion propose that the mark of totalitarian ideologies is a particular kind of rigidity: to elevate a single ideal to a position of supreme importance, so as to determine the rest of the system. On the theory's key analogy this single ideal involves, in the traditional and monotheistic religions, the concept of in God's place -class, race or nation (which likewise functions as 'object for veneration' and 'supreme ethical precept of public life'). 23 This is decontestation-as-sacralisation: the challenge of the complexity of ideological content is papered over by what appears to be a novel claim about ideological structure, the key pay-off of which is to be able to explain a special intensity in belief. 24 It is no accident that many of the authors of the end-of-ideology make use of religious tropes: Daniel Bell described the thinking that concerned him as 'chiliastic', 'millenarian' and 'apocalyptic', 25 Raymond Aron derided intellectuals as political religions' new 'priests', and in this sense the contemporary theorists of political religion simply mimic them. 26 But while the account of totalitarian ideology certainly needs to make space for structural specificities -all ideologies can be expected to possess those -that cannot, surely, be the final word on the subject, in the absence of saying much that is enlightening about the substance, as well as intensity, of belief.
So what would it mean to go beyond conceptualising totalitarian ideology as a structure and to do a better job of engaging content? It would be wrong to suggest that the end-of-ideology perspectives are all structure and no content, inasmuch as they feature utopianism. But they leave content one dimensional, making it a matter of utopianism alone and it is only sidestepped in the use of expressions like 'ideological configuration' (which has been reverted to twice even in the analysis above). 30 The latter expression, however, already indicates a preference to take on a broader object of study than might otherwise be the case.
In other words, ideology scholars are already tilting toward the understanding whereby ideology covers a level of articulation. They should commit themselves more fully, for if a 'real world' of political thinking deserves ideological analysis, then logically that must be so in whole, not just part. The mistake, however, would be to see such a choice as a stark either/ or. Rather than to stop thinking in terms of reasonably-bounded packages, the productive way of analysing an extended field may be to multiply their number.
Thus, there is a challenge which is common to the analysis of totalitarian thinking and to reinvigorating ideology study in general. Once we accept a brief to analyse thoughtconstructs of all sorts of degree of prima facie coherence, we will find we need the right kinds of tools for the job. 31 In order, therefore, to identify what may be newcomers -like totalitarianism -to an extended field, the solution may consist in the trial-and-error application of a whole assortment of methodological strategies. For we are likely to find the need not only for re-sharpened tools, but for different kinds of tools in order to perform different kinds of job. Where totalitarianism magnifies a dilemma for study in general, a first claim regarding this widened area of study therefore involves the analysis of an ideological field pictured as far more multi-layered. A specific claim concerns interdisciplinarity: an opportunity to refine and/ or supplement strategies will be presented by openness towards interdisciplinarity. For the attitude towards study being promoted, it may be fruitful to think of a package becoming reasonably bounded at the moment a 'pattern' can be found to a body of defences of a certain way of living, thinking and/ or doing, and on the understanding that patterns identify linkages and/ or independencies that are regular and archetypical. 32 To effect this, however, may require a certain amount of nudging. Analysts will need to get into the habit of thinking, without prejudice, about the 'units' between which linkages and interdependencies may exist as open-ended and interchangeable: in a more creative take on inquiry, the only restraining condition should be that units are kept commensurate within a single analysis. It is in this particular respect that interdisciplinarity is suggestive, because the intersection of ideology studies with various disciplinary traditions -intellectual history, political science, sociology, psychology -will produce prospective units in a variety (concepts, values, symbols, images, emotions, rhetorics, rituals, illusions, dispositions, and so on). Where such units are already established tools for ideology analysts, none will need to be newly fashioned, but it may be that these are only for starters. First, that is because within the disciplines, there are likely to be distinct approaches that throw up different options. 31 It is, after all, precisely the intention to analyse thought-constructs with varying degrees of sophistication which is the mark of separation with the disciplinary area of political philosophy. 32 Freeden, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 5
Second, it is because a trial-and-error approach is likely to lead to further refining of units selected, in order to get them to do the precise job required. To return from the general to the particular, one new interpretation of totalitarianism in creative spirit is to find pattern by adopting some units in both these respects. One way of providing totalitarianism with the coherence that is otherwise missing, to show now, is in the act of applying one specific approach from the history of political thought.
Totalitarian ideology as a recalcitrant text
To summarise, totalitarianism's ideology is complex. A vital clue is provided in the New
Man idea (or more formally, anthropological revolution), but for the purposes of identification this should be taken as no more than a clue. Rather more likely is that more than a single dynamic will be in play. To do the decoding, end-of-ideology perspectives pick out single fundamental ideals like 'race', 'nation' and 'class', yet that is to reach for the 'macro' kind of analysis which can only ever illuminate up to a point. Thus, one key task for micro analysis is to treat such ideas as code to various things that are actually going on, as opposed, in the cruder sense, to simply the focal points of political fanaticism. In pursuing of this more enlightening form of interpretation, the problem is that the tools most readily to hand prove to be ineffective. Hence, on the reasoning just presented, totalitarianism is precisely one of those instances where in order to discern pattern, newly-fashioned units may be called for.
Consider that many of the most obvious strategies for micro analysis are failures. A good illustration is in trying to apply to totalitarianism the various methodological strategies that have been proposed for fascism in the last two decades of study. The analogy is especially appropriate for the reason that the history of commentary on 'generic fascism' has followed the same course: from a focus on structure and institutions to one centred around content and ideas. 33 The strategies have been basically threefold. None would seem effective in totalitarianism's case but, importantly, for different reasons, which provides a yet sharper sense of the obstacles the new tools must get around.
A first option for a content-focused theory of fascist ideology has been the 'fascist minimum'. 34 One aspect of the problem in constructing totalitarian ideology is to specify an ideological space important enough to matter. A minimum lists the shared features of two or more cases that overlap, yet just a crude exercise in reconciling standard ideas associated with fascism and communism suggests the direct commonalities are so few as to be meaningless. 35 Although a 'totalitarian minimum' does have one same advantage as a fascist minimum -sensitivity to irreducible differences in overlapping cases. Two alternative strategies are more promising. In effect, they concede the overlapping space is small, but seek to say more by shifting the emphasis to linking up the (few) features so that they become intelligible when taken together. In other words, they make the attempt to find pattern. A second strategy is thereby the totalitarian 'matrix' or 'ideal-type'. 37 Here, respectively, the emphasis is on connecting up features into a gridlike system or, as is comparable, on finding logical consistency between a set of features which may extend a little further, since the measure becomes abstraction -which will likely make less of a requirement that the features be expressed in each representative case. But take just two ideas standardly associated with totalitarianism: utopia, and a belief-in-science taken to extreme degree. Trying to connect up just these two idea meets with frustration, since on Hannah Arendt's well-known example, while the utopian feature points to human hubris, totalitarian science points to über-determinism. 38 This failure is helpful to note since it provides a very sharp sense of one challenge facing new tools if they are to discern pattern effectively. Not simply to reconcile inconsistency, but to take on what are ostensibly points of outright contradiction.
Third, trialling a morphological strategy is interesting because trying -and failing -to identify a core of conceptual decontestations points not only to the difficulty of finding significant regularities, but also to the creative rethink of units. 39 Once more, irreducible differences between overlapping cases can be expected to mean that, at most, no more than a few propositions about key political concepts are advanced by all totalitarians. For instance, concerning the concept of solidarity, fascists and communists will advance propositions with 37 E.g. R. Eatwell, 'The nature of "generic fascism": the "fascist minimum" and the "fascist matrix"', in proposes that a configuration is exempt from 'full' status of ideology if it fails to provide enough conceptual decontestations to answer all questions deemed basic to political life. This is the understanding that debars new entrants (like nationalism) to the field on equal terms. 40 What this precludes, though, is the possibility that at least in part, ideologies may be identified in virtue of addressing questions which are selective and rather idiosyncratic to political life. Perhaps questions asked can be as constitutive as answers given. In which case, the analyst cannot assume they come prefabricated, on the supposition they are constant.
So what new methodological strategy for interpreting totalitarianism might fare better?
The following is projected as the model for creatively combining insights from across disciplines. On the one hand, a morphological strategy is adapted so that emphasis extends out from answers to the questions to which they are attached. To supplement that move is where instruction may be taken from the history of political thought. In a general respect, thinking about ideology on the notion of the recalcitrant text ought to renew the understanding that when we are interpreting ideologies we are, like historians, interpreting texts, complete with the corresponding demands. But the more particular -and 'disciplinary' -insight is provided in the 'Collingwoodian' approach to textual interpretation.
Collingwood's approach -from which Quentin Skinner famously draws inspiration -is apposite because of the implication that in order to comprehend in its worldly character, we will have to steel ourselves for a fair amount of detective work. 41 In adaptation of morphology, this problem tallies with getting at questions as an interpretive task in its own right. Like Collingwood's historian, the analyst of ideology will need to move back and forth between 'question' and 'answer' -matching them together; rather than focus on the answers alone -no matter however closely they are read. But the strategy also involves an adaptation of the insight from Collingwood. In Collingwood's discussion, the suggestion is (perhaps unconsciously) to interpret texts by matching together a single coupling of question-and-answer. No consideration is given to the plural. Yet a significant possibility is that ideologies -and for matter, the more accurate meanings of historical textsmay comprise several couplings of question-and-answer. In a nutshell, the proposal is that totalitarianism can be identified in a pattern of regular question-and-answer couplings that are capable of being reasonably-clearly specified. 43 An empirical demonstration that tries to specify these couplings is offered below.
Prior, in order to indicate some general lessons, it is useful to extract three respects in which this strategy has purchase on the kind of ideology which is recalcitrant. First, the strategy accepts that such an ideology may have no more than a few generalizable features: the couplings are pictured as several, but without requirement that they extend to any great length. For totalitarian ideology to have full status, it will be enough to show a pattern's presence. Second, the strategy has the capacity to accommodate the appearance of contradiction: shifting the focus of interpretation towards the questions that totalitarians ask makes up for the tension that might well exist between the answers they give. Third, a way of accommodating inconsistency not within but between totalitarians is provided for in the distinction between answers and propositions. Consider that to comprise the difference between ideological content which is thematic and parochial. The answers that totalitarians give will be thematically similar but the propositions that they offer in support of them may be parochially different.
The demonstration below contends that totalitarianism's substantive themes are threefold. Two of these have been anticipated in the discussion so far; none has been given much definition. 44 First, 'utopianism' refers to the perfected community. Second, 'scientism' refers to the claims of totalitarians to know and speak 'truth' on the authority of science.
Third, 'revolutionary violence' refers to the expectation that the commission of violent acts will enable a New Man to emerge 'reborn'. A longer demonstration would be more persuasive, but the aim is to offer enough to show the value of the strategy, and in the process to evidence the case for admitting totalitarianism to our classificatory schemes on more equal terms.
On the claim that it is 'elite' thinking that matters most in the totalitarian political context, two specific texts are used as microcosms to represent, and resolve, the recalcitrance of the ideology. be 'modal', which is really the problem of empathy when a stance expressed towards the human condition appears alien to one's own. 48 It is very clear that this will apply, and so care must to taken to avoid imposing the sorts of value judgment which distort interpretation.
Third, recalcitrance can be 'tactical'. This is when authors deliberately manipulate their readers, and though in general that difficulty will require decoding rhetoric, here it is expressed in the tendency of Mein Kampf to report episodes that are factually untrue. The Party gave plain and definitive answers to all these questions. Yes… a Socialist economic system could be and should be built in our country, for we had everything needed for the building of a Socialist economic system, for the building of a complete Socialist society…. Now, the main task was to proceed to build a new, Socialist economic system all over our country… Neither the delay of the revolution in the West, nor the partial stabilization of capitalism in the non-Soviet countries would stop our advance -to Socialism… But the Party knew that the problem of the victory of mission', 'the mission of humanity', the 'noble development' of man. 58 Second, in order to grasp the collectivist element, value judgments have to be avoided. Negatively, collectivism appears in the association of Jewishness with 'hyper-individualism' and 'egoism and selfishness'. 59 In the constructive part, collectivism feature in the positive valuation given to 'racial unity' and to the 'tightly organised political community of faith and struggle, unified in spirit and will'. 60 The specific information that makes it plausible to identify a question per se -to which these propositions about utopianism form the corresponding answer - Rather, the true community will need to give free rein to the 'culture-creating ability' peculiar to the Aryans. 63 The second opponent, the Marxist, misses the state's legitimacy precisely as the tool for achieving the 'higher level' of human development. In short, when properly ordered, völk is prior to state. It is very clear again that, thematically, utopianism provides
Hitler with the resource for this response to a community question. The passage that contains the best precis of the utopian reasoning on show appears at the end of the chapter (with emphasis added to some further perfectionist language):
The state is a means to an end. Its end lies in the preservation and advancement of a community of physically and psychically homogenous creatures. This preservation 58 When understood thematically, scientism should be understood as a resource that allows totalitarians to think carefully about both history's character and history's subjectmatter, by adopting loosely 'Darwinian' ideas on classification and evolutionism. 70 Note especially here the potential solution to the one of the sharpest challenges facing a methodological strategy. Scientism expresses a point of contradiction with utopianism which seems striking: where the utopianism that was picked out earlier allows totalitarians to think
in terms of open-ended possibility, scientism provides a sense of what is predetermined.
However, this does not entail that, when properly handled by interpretation, the two cannot be reconciled, in identifying a pattern. For totalitarians, scientism provides the knowledge of how the (utopian) end-state will materialise. For the Nazi utopia to materialise, all that is necessary is for history to follow its own 'rigid law of necessity', as a scientifically-knowable struggle between races-as-species. 71 That is Hitler's 'scientistic' proposition when the history question arises. One distinctive aspect is that Hitler frames this as a question about historical decline. Textually, this can be seen by noting that the discussion in 'Nation and Race' is really an extension of the chapters which precede it, which asks: 72 is his peculiar anxiety that the Germans will ultimately refuse to led by history's supposedly 'iron logic'. He 'who misjudges and disregards the racial laws actually forfeits the happiness that seems destined to be his'. 74 In the case of Soviet communism, there will of course be less that is novel in the claim that a question about history is being answered in a language of science, even if the debt to Darwin is less stark. […] if the world is knowable and our knowledge of the laws of development of nature is authentic, having the validity of objective truth, it follows that social life, the development of society, is also knowable, and that the data of science regarding the laws of development of society are authentic data having the validity of objective truths.
Hence the science of the history of society, despite all the complexity of the phenomenon of social life, can become as precise as, let us say, biology, and capable of making use of the laws of development of society for practical purposes.
Hence the party of the proletariat should not guide itself in its practical activity by causal motives, but by the laws of development of society, and by practical deductions from these laws.
Hence socialism is converted from a dream of a better future for humanity into a science.
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In raising this conception of history to the status of party orthodoxy -rather than anotherthe Bolsheviks thereby succeeded (opines the Short Course) against 'the motley crowd of revisionists and renegades of the period'. Certainly, the anti-utopian language is observable.
But in the main note, first, that it is a version of historical materialism that steps outside Marx's own: it is the intrusion of Darwinian thinking, of the type that Engels, via Plekhanov, transmitted to Lenin (and it is revealing that the section of text quotes both figures liberally).
Not only does history have its own laws, but 'laws of nature' extend into human history. 77 definition, such propositions may be understood to be those which do not justify violence in politics as a matter of necessity, but instead as a matter of transforming identity. Hence, violence will be regenerative -destructive and creative at the same time. And hence, totalitarians will be able to picture the 'New Man' being given final shape, somehow being given new direction by embracing conflict. Isolating discrete sections of text that match together question and answer is not so easy in this case, and perhaps that is only to be expected. One reason is that violence may be less a matter of (totalitarian) reasoning than practice. Another reason is that violence may also be expressed as much in imagery and metaphor.
81 Nevertheless, it proves quite possible to show that sections of both Mein Kampf and Short Course not only evidence question-and-answer, but point also to some distinctive propositions.
The following passage of Mein Kampf contains one nstance of violence's identityrelated justification:
The soul of the people can only be won if along with carrying on a positive struggle for our own aims, we destroy the opponent of these aims. 81 Metaphors and images of violence feature throughout Mein Kampf.
The people at all times see the proof of their own right in ruthless attack on a foe, and to them renouncing the destruction of the adversary seems like uncertainty with regard to their own right if not a sign of their own unright.
The broad masses are only a piece of Nature and their sentiment does not understand the mutual handshake of people who claim that they want the opposite things. What they desire is the victory of the stronger and the destruction of the weak or his unconditional subjection.
The nationalization of the masses will succeed only when, aside from all the positive struggle for the soul of our people, their international poisoners are exterminated 82 Here, the most indicative clause is the reference to winning the soul of the people. The local version of a question about action and conflict appears just prior in the text -where Hitler raises the issue of 'regaining German power' in the face of the disarmament imposed at Versailles. 83 In itself, this is unremarkable. However, the revealing aspect is that Hitler actively amends this (his) question, 'Not: How shall we manufacture arms? But: How shall we manufacture the spirit which enables a people to bear arms?' 84 What is at stake therefore changes, so that identity becomes the subject.
In the case of Stalinist violence the corresponding propositions are, notably, to be found in the presentation of the 'intensification of the class struggle' (which Kolakowski viewed as one of Stalin's very few genuine innovations to Marxism). 85 This doctrine states:
the more the building of socialism progresses, the fiercer the class struggle becomes, because the enemy grows ever more desperate. Islamism within a general nineteenth-century cult of progress (the 'Positivist catechism').
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The burden of proof must be to demonstrate that Islamism's strong truth-assertions do come from confidence in a deterministic philosophy of history, since a commonsensical view says they derive instead from deference to scriptural authority ('literalism', 'fundamentalism'). 93 On this score, Gray offers no first-hand textual evidence. His case rests rather on the background religious residue in positivism -allegedly, providence emptied of 'transcendence and mystery'. 94 This case is weak: Gray's theological reference is to eschatological traditions which are Judeo-Christian. 95 However, there is certain a possibility to pursue the kind of nineteenth-century colonisation of parts of the Islamic world by the West). 96 This raises a very suggestive parallel with Nazism, by similarly emphasising anxieties focused around declinism.
The third coupling, action/ revolutionary violence -and once more, the need to reflect further -is well featured in Roger Griffin's Terrorist's Creed. In Griffin's highly original account, the key definitional feature of Islamism becomes an 'existential dread of permanent anomy' intensified by 'the erosion of the Islamic sacred canopy' (in other words, the superseded, meaning-supplying worldview). This dread is what fuels the 'active nihilism' expressed in acts such as those involving martyrdom. 97 From a question-and-answer perspective, Griffin's account offers food for thought because violence is situated in response to a local question about 'jihad'. 98 Yet retuning may be required nonetheless because Griffin relies on quite a grand thesis about a historical-psychological void: reasonably, there will be much which is not 'existential' in Islamist violence (or not purely so), and perhaps thinking about that will necessitate then careful selection, and reading, of Islamist texts. Certainly, those texts would need to supplement the works of fiction (Dostoevsky, Conrad, Taxi Driver) that Griffin often, albeit creatively, reads off from.
Conclusion
Totalitarianism presents a complication for textbook-style classifications of ideology, and in this it is not alone. Close consideration of the basis upon which it may enter such classifications is interesting, because since the middle of the twentieth century debates about totalitarianism's identity have been, at the same time, debates about the meaning of ideology.
The most serious obstacle to totalitarianism's inclusion in classificatory schemes concerns an apparent incoherence in its content. Yet, it has been argued, if only the tools of analysis in ideology studies were to become more flexible, then totalitarianism belongs to a range of political thought-constructs which may become ideologies. To provide such flexibility, what may be helpful is the sort of interpretative pluralism which is informed by interdisciplinarity.
Meanwhile this would amount to an attitude to study which would help resolve a current uncertainty: namely, whether what defines ideology is, on the one hand, enclosure within a package or, on the other, articulation within a particular realm of discourse. Ideology is both of those things.
The potentially most far-reaching aspect of what I have proposed, however, consists in strategies for dealing with the whole broad sweep of ideology's troublesome cases.
Ideology scholars are faced with handling a large number of 'also-rans', of which just a few are environmentalism, welfarism, and populism (and it is not the 'isms' that are stake, since other relevant constructs are, say, 'anti-immigration' or 'reaction'). The interpretive pluralism I have proposed is addressed first of all to the identification of the also-rans, but in the longer run may also speak to a second problem of methodology: boundaries. 99 It is fair to say that one problem here is the extension of the other, because where identification tackles ideology's coherences internally, the boundary problem engages that in an external respect.
In an ideological field which is cast as both busier and mulitlayered, a central task will likely become that of explaining the ways in which ideologies are overlapping. Thus, adjusting the lens so as to reframe the whole, we should be readied to view a complex picture. In places ideologies will intertwine, segments of some will overlay others. Explaining this picture is a demanding prospect, which may, for instance, require reconciling different methodological strategies so that they can be deployed without contradiction in any one overarching 99 assessment. And if that is so, then ultimately what ideology scholars may sooner or later come up against is a challenge far bigger than the one the discussion started from. In order to make space for new entrants, textbooks of ideology will need not just extending but also significantly rethinking in their organising principles.
